Understanding the Enemy

Louise Richardson, a lecturer at Harvard, is the author of a just published book on terrorism and how to tackle it. “What Terrorists Want: Understanding the Enemy. Containing the Threat.” Shockingly it does not reference the Bush explanation of thugs who hate our freedom. Instead it tries to understand what drives terrorists so that effective strategies can be formed to counter their success. Martin Walker, a UPI editor, wrote a review in last Sunday’s NY Times Book Review.

Karl Rove’s observation that virile conservatives march forth to defeat their terrorist enemies while epicene liberals seek to understand them was memorable for its partisan venom. Yet the fact is, without making a thorough effort to comprehend the motives, fears and capabilities of Al Qaeda’s militants, we can hardly hope to defeat them.

Modern terrorists — whether operating in the United States, Europe or the Middle East — have sought to understand us and the vulnerabilities of our open societies. It is high time we sought to understand them.

Richardson suggests that like all terrorist movements, Al Qaeda requires three components: alienated individuals, a complicit society or community, and a legitimizing ideology. Its troops are motivated by some mixture of three key goals: revenge, renown and reaction from the enemy.

Richardson goes on to argue that the policies of the Bush administration have provided Al Qaeda with great renown and monstrous overreaction — precisely the stimulants it needs to prosper. By declaring “war” on terrorism, the White House has defined the struggle against Al Qaeda essentially as a military problem, best managed by the Pentagon. This flies in the face of all available evidence from successful antiterror campaigns. These include the British operations in Malaya in the 1950’s, the penetration of Shining Path by the Peruvian police, the defeats Turkey has inflicted on the Kurdish P.K.K. and, most recently, the co-option of the I.R.A. leadership into electoral politics through the cooperation of the London and Dublin governments.

These successes have a number of features in common. They were led primarily by police intelligence units working in very close coordination with other arms of the state, including the military and the judiciary, as well as local economic development teams. Government officials all came to understand that they were faced with what was fundamentally a political challenge, and that the prime objective was to separate the terrorists from their base in the community. This meant addressing the grievances of that base seriously, and it meant cooperating with moderates in that community who might have shared some of the terrorists’ goals but shrank from their tactics.

A successful counterterrorist campaign, Richardson explains, seeks to empower and legitimize the nonviolent moderates, thus isolating the terrorists. Success requires governments to hold the moral high ground, convincing the undecided that the state and its agents are the good guys, who enforce democratic principles and civil liberties even among their own troops and police officers. In other words, with an effective antiterrorist policy there would be no Guantánamo, no detention without fair trial, no secret wiretapping programs and no “renditions” of suspects to friendly but foul regimes that practice torture. Intelligence organizations would operate under clear and strict judicial guidelines, with transparent political oversight.

In its determination to display resolve, Richardson says, the Bush administration has so far failed to learn these lessons. She points out that most governments go through an initial phase of draconian measures with full public support, a second phase of polarization, when liberals bleating about human and civic rights are treated as semitraitorous wimps, and a third phase that comes with the understanding that the tough tactics are not working as expected and that (as Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld seems to have realized in Iraq) they are creating new terrorists faster than the old ones can be killed or neutralized.

This third phase leads to a reassessment, and then to a search for ways to divide the enemy and exploit the merest hint of division or ideological argument. Al Qaeda, for its part, has already shown itself quite adept at the tactic of dividing the enemy, exploiting differences between Washington and its European allies. And if senior figures in the Bush administration are even bothering to read bin Laden’s speeches, they should have noticed that he condemns the United States for its rejection of the International Criminal Court and for turning a blind eye to the profiteering of the Halliburton Company. As Richardson points out, this suggests that bin Laden has taken to heart “Lenin’s key contribution to terrorist strategy ... the importance of exploiting every fragment of local alienation for its own ends.”