Stay the Course

Yesterday in response to critics' description of the Bush Iraq strategy, White House press secretary Tony Snow declared "That [it] is not a stay-the-course policy." Bush and Republican candidates are now going to great lengths to demonstrate how flexible they are and how willing to change policies if something is not working.

The amnesia that engulfs their current statements, the ignoring of what they were saying that was completely different just a short time ago, is the way they have operated for the duration of the Bush Presidency.

A few quotes from our President:

I saw people wondering whether the United States would have the nerve to stay the course and help them succeed. ----- June 2006

We will win in Iraq so long as we stay the course. ----- July 2006

We will stay the course. We will help this young Iraqi democracy succeed. ----- August 2006

Tony Snow claimed he could only find eight such quotes uttered by Bush. (I guess unless he says something more than fill in the blank times it doesn't count). But even that statement was wrong, or misleading. The liberal Center for American Progress then quickly posted a list of 30 instances when Bush argued to "stay the course."

But that was then, this is now. And now Republican Congressional safe seats are in jeopardy. But they are caught in a trap of their own making. So they lie and hope the American Public is suffering from extreme short-term memory loss. Having never previously admitted that they were wrong, a change now can only be interpreted as the failure of what they have done since the 2003 Iraq invasion. Maureen Dowd today referred to this change, at least in slogans, since they are sending mixed messages about what they intend to do as "The president is cutting and running from the president".

The Republican campaign strategy is in turmoil with Republicans racing to distance themselves from the President after providing lock-step support for 5 ½ years. Does anyone think that if they save their seats they will continue to embrace this newly discovered independence after November 7? One of their more egregious candidates, Kathryn Harris, in Florida, had to resort in her most recent debate with the tired charge that Democrats are in favor of cutting and running in Iraq and by so doing will debase the sacrifice of the 2,700 Americans who have died in Iraq. This tortured justification is wrong on both counts. If we leave Iraq it should be to concentrate our efforts where they should have been following 9/11: destroying Al Qaeda, removing the Taliban, rebuilding Afghanistan, and eliminating Islamic terrorists and the root causes for anti-Americanism. Continuing in Iraq for the purpose of honoring American deaths by killing 2,700 more Americans, and countless Iraqis, in an unending war with no end in sight, is a bankrupt concept.

The Washington Post/ABC poll released yesterday shows increasing support for Democrats by the American people but also contained one revealing statistic: 39% of Republicans believe that Iraq has not damaged the United States’ image in the rest of the world. You can believe everything Bush and Cheney say, even taking into account how they have changed their positions over the past five years, and manufacture a rationale in support. But how can anybody with an iota of intelligence not recognize our diminished posture in the world (which is fact not open to interpretation) and that it has exploded because of this Administration’s policies? There is only one explanation and I will turn to John Stuart Mill who figured it out sometime ago:

I never meant to say that the Conservatives are generally stupid. I meant to say that stupid people are generally Conservative. I believe that is so obviously and universally admitted a principle that I hardly think any gentleman will deny it.

The Problem is Oil

With all the problems encountered by the Bush Administration, one that is ignored, other than by an occasional statement from the President that we are “addicted to oil,” is the long-term impact of oil politics and economics on the well-being of the United States. Joshua Kurlantzick writing in The New Republic on October 2, 2006 described one of the most profoundly scary scenarios waiting for us in the future. Contemplating this article results in dismay at the lack of action by our Government in preparing for the eventual crisis that we may face. Bush is not pushing for the development of alternatives to oil; we are not forcing car manufacturers to increase mileage; we have alienated our allies who will be in the same position we will be and who ought to be joining with us to address this problem. Given his proclivity for keeping Americans frightened, it is apparent that as with almost everything else he has done, he is unable to recognize and to analyze where to marshal our resources and what is of real importance to our survival. Following are major excerpts from the Kurlantzick article:

Earlier this year, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad arrived in China … [at] a meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), a regional group linking China, Russia, and Central Asia. He touted Moscow, Tehran, and Beijing's "identical" views on world issues. And he proposed making "the SCO into a strong and influential economic, political, and trade institution [to] thwart the threat of domineering powers." One can guess which domineering power he had in mind.

Ahmadinejad's Shanghai strategy signals a potentially momentous change in the international system--a change overshadowed by the war on terrorism. In four key regions of the globe--East Asia, the former Soviet Union, the Middle East, and Latin America--a toxic combination of factors has created a new, fluid alliance of nations that could potentially oppose the United States and other democracies. In the past five years, each of these regions have witnessed rising nationalism and anti-Americanism, the result of greater domestic confidence and clumsy U.S. foreign policy. In all four regions, countries that have flirted with democracy since 1989 have begun to turn their backs on it. And, in all four regions, authoritarian governments have a new weapon, one potentially more powerful than nukes or suicide bombers: oil.

Three of these regions contain major oil exporters, while China, thanks to its powerhouse economy, is now the world's second-largest oil consumer, behind the United States. China's appetite gives these countries an alternative to the United States and other democratic oil-guzzling customers--and thereby holds this loose alliance together.
As Middle East experts Flynt Leverett and Pierre Noel note in a fascinating recent National Interest article, with their power, confidence, and common interest in oil, the members of this new alliance probably will ensure that Iran obtains nuclear capacity. And Iran could be only the beginning. This alliance of authoritarian regimes--Leverett and Noel, along with others like economist Irwin Stelzer, call it an "axis of oil"--could pose the most serious threat to the United States and its democratic allies since the collapse of the Soviet empire.

Less than a decade ago, most policymakers thought oil's viability as a weapon had gone out with skinny ties and the Electric Light Orchestra. In 1999, when oil prices hovered around $15 per barrel, The Economist headlined one article, "drowning in oil." Its prediction--that "[t]he world is awash with the stuff, and it is likely to remain so"--was wrong. Today, energy industry analysts worry that production won't be able to keep up with growing demand. The International Energy Agency believes global energy demand will grow between 37 and 50 percent by 2030. Already, the inflation-adjusted price of oil has quadrupled in the past five years. And even the fabled Saudi oil reserves are under stress.

The demand for oil--and gas, too--is skyrocketing largely because of rising consumption in China and India, which have vast populations only beginning to climb the economic ladder. China alone accounted for 30 percent of the increase in world demand in 2004 and will eventually overtake the United States as the world's biggest oil consumer--marking a change at the top of the world oil market for the first time in decades.
Increasingly, this oil and gas will be concentrated in the hands of producers from the Middle East, the former Soviet Union, and Latin America--not in democracies like Norway, the United Kingdom, or the United States. The output of the North Sea is believed to have peaked, and America's domestic oil production has been declining for over 20 years. Russia and Iran possess the world's largest natural gas reserves.

Five years ago--before Hu Jintao took over, Vladimir Putin consolidated control, and many of Latin America's leaders came to power--Western nations at least could hope that these oil producers and China, the major oil consumer, were slowly becoming like Norway: stable, pro-American democracies. Only a willfully blind person could say the same today. In the Middle East, recent glimmers of greater freedom in Egypt and Syria have disappeared. And populist leaders--some with minimal commitment to democracy--now run Venezuela, Bolivia, and other Latin American countries.

Public opinion in these countries doesn't just support autocracy. It also opposes the United States. And since authoritarian leaders have their own reasons to fear the United States--namely the threat to their rule posed by Washington's democratization push--they are more than happy to encourage anti-American sentiments and to act on them. The numbers tell the story. A recent Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA) survey revealed that only 25 percent of Russians think the United States is having a positive impact on the world, while a similar PIPAstudy found that only 22 percent of Chinese have a positive view of the United States. One Zogby International study of Latin Americans found that more than 80 percent dislike how the United States handles international relations. Another Zogby study reported that people in nearly every Arab nation lowered their opinion of the United States between 2002 and 2005.

Much of this is likely attributable to anger surrounding Bush's controversial foreign policy and U.S.-led globalization. But specific geopolitical grievances have also exacerbated these resentments, fostering nationalism and pushing countries to look for relationships that do not involve Washington. Russians fear the expansion of NATO and the work of U.S.-funded pro-democracy NGOs in former Soviet republics. "The U.S. has created a circle around Russia," Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov complained to foreign journalists. In China, scholars with close government links told me that Beijing fears that the U.S. presence in Afghanistan--combined with America's closer ties to Singapore, India, and Japan--is part of a strategy to ring China with military forces. In Latin America, many people remain angry that Bush, who when first elected vowed to make the region his top priority, has almost completely ignored his southern neighbors. And, in the Middle East, where Iraq dominates the news, one study by Mamoun Fandy of Rice University found that "Arabs seem frightened by the prospect of a unipolar [world] led by the United States."

As public opinion toward the United States has turned sour, China's popularity has shown strength. One PIPA poll found that Russians have a broadly positive view of China's economic system, government, and worldwide influence. Meanwhile, Fandy's study showed that Arabs "find in Beijing a counter-weight" to American power.

With oil becoming increasingly valuable, these authoritarian-leaning, anti-American states have taken a mercantilist view of the world. They do not follow the classic mercantilism of the eighteenth century, when nations believed power rested solely on amassing state resources and protecting their economies. China's economy, after all, is open, and Russia seeks to become a full member of the World Trade Organization. But like early-twentieth-century Germany and Japan--two states that also had embraced liberalism and begun to turn back toward authoritarian rule--today's autocrats have decided that the state must take control of vital resources like oil and gas, locking them up rather than leaving them to the market.

Putin's plans to develop oil as a state weapon have long been clear. As director of the Federal Security Service (successor to the KGB) in St. Petersburg in the '90s, he authored an article arguing that the state should use natural resources to wield power. Since then, Putin has surrounded himself with former colleagues from St. Petersburg who share his views. In 2004, Putin and friends dismantled oil giant Yukos, a private company, and sold many of its assets to Rosneft, a state company. They boosted the power of state gas firm Gazprom; as Putin bluntly announced, "Gazprom is a powerful political and economic lever of influence over the rest of the world." This week--in a move widely interpreted as an attempt to assert more control over its resources--Russia revoked an environmental permit for a Royal Dutch Shell oil and gas project off the country's Pacific coast. Russians likely approved: A recent poll revealed strong Russian popular support for energy nationalization.

Other autocrats have followed a similar path. In Venezuela, Hugo Chávez took over the formerly independent Petróleos de Venezuela. Chávez ally Evo Morales has sent the army into Bolivian gas fields and nationalized Bolivia's industry. Ecuador's government has assumed control of U.S. oil company Occidental's holdings. And, in Iran, Ahmadinejad has tightened state control over the oil industry, promising to favor domestic investors and placing close allies--and former Revolutionary Guards--in key positions.

Today, these state oil companies sit atop unrivaled fortunes--a trend that, until recently, few policymakers seemed to notice. As The Wall Street Journal recently reported, "Ninety percent of the world's untapped conventional oil reserves are in the hands of governments or state-owned oil companies, far more than was the case several decades ago." Last year, Iran earned $45 billion in oil profits, the biggest take-home since 1974. Russia's gross domestic product has grown from some $200 billion in 1999 to nearly $1 trillion today. Venezuela has posted some of the highest economic growth rates in the world--over 9 percent in 2005.

So autocratic nations, with China increasingly as their main consumer, now have a potent weapon to wield against the West for the first time since the fall of the Soviet Union. Sure, North Korea has missiles and, probably, nuclear weapons; but it is unclear if its missiles can even reach Alaska. Al Qaeda can manage vicious attacks all over the world; but it cannot truly harm developed economies, as the rebound from September 11 and the London bombings showed. China, by itself, could eventually become a true military powerhouse; but, currently, its military is at least 20 years from posing such a threat. Working together, however, this axis of autocrats can hamstring the world economy and, by extension, the United States and its democratic allies. And they have set about doing exactly that.

Over the past five years--as American policymakers focused on the war on terrorism--these countries have begun to feel one another out. At first, many autocratic leaders were drawn to China, the major oil consumer. The Saudi royal family's anger with America's war on Islamic radicalism pushed Riyadh toward Beijing. King Abdullah became the first Saudi ruler to visit the Chinese capital, and the Saudis recently allowed Hu Jintao to address the shura council, the royal circle, a privilege Bush has never been granted. Other Arab oil producers, from Algeria to Syria, also started reaching out to China. Venezuela and China have made similar moves, as Chávez pushed for a closer partnership and China has supported Venezuela's bid for a U.N. Security Council seat.

Some of these embraces, to be fair, may be only short-term marriages of convenience. For instance, Russia fears that closer ties with China will lead to an influx of cheap Chinese goods, while Chinese officials worry about the instability of Chávez and Ahmadinejad. Moreover, for China, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela, trade with the United States still dwarfs trade with fellow autocrats; and the United States remains, for now, the biggest consumer in the world oil market.

Still, in the last two years, the axis has begun to solidify. The autocrats are building more lasting relationships, and, while many first developed ties to China, they are now crafting bilateral ties to one another as well. For example, Venezuela has begun cultivating a close diplomatic and commercial relationship with Iran, which has pledged to invest $9 billion in Venezuela in return. The autocrats are also collaborating to control natural resources. According to the Financial Times, Chávez enlisted Iranian advisers to help him figure out how to ship more oil to China. Learning from his Venezuelan mentor, Morales of Bolivia took one of his first state trips to Beijing, where he invited China to access his state's resources. Meanwhile, Moscow recently inked a new deal to provide China with billions of dollars in gas, even as it refused to negotiate gas deals with many Western nations. And Tehran's mullahs have persuaded Beijing to develop a $100 billion oilfield in Iran. Already, Iran supplies some 14 percent of China's oil.

Now, with a vast new market in China, the petroleum producers can consider reducing deliveries to the West, a far greater weapon today than during the 1970s oil embargo, when oil producers did not have an alternative consumer. Chávez has threatened to cut off all oil shipments to the United States and recently cut off supplies to some Citgo gas stations here. (Venezuela owns Citgo.) As energy scholars Gal Luft and Anne Korin note, Saudi officials also have begun speaking openly about cutting off oil to the United States--presumably if America's image in the Muslim world declines so much that Riyadh cannot afford an alliance with Washington. Russia has gone further, using its resources to punish enemies that lean toward the West. This winter, state-controlled Gazprom temporarily cut off gas supplies to pro-Western Ukraine. Russia also cut off gas supplies to Moldova, and explosions in Russian pipelines to Georgia shut down gas deliveries to that nation, a close U.S. friend. (Though Moscow blamed the explosions on sabotage, the Georgian president claimed it was a deliberate Russian ploy.) With these moves, Moscow reminded Europe how dependent it is on Russia, which will supply nearly two-thirds of the continent's gas in the future.

Of course, reorienting oil infrastructure to export to China takes time--at least five to ten years, according to most petroleum experts. But, if that happens, the results could be disastrous for the United States. A disturbing recent study by the Government Accountability Office provided a sign of the dangers to the U.S. economy. The study examined the impact of a potential Venezuelan oil embargo on exports to the United States. It found that an embargo could add $11 to the global price of a barrel of oil and shave up to $23 billion off America's gross domestic product. It also admitted that the U.S. government has few options to handle a long-term shut-off of Venezuelan oil. And Venezuela is only the world's eighth-largest exporter of crude--a minnow in the global gas and oil market compared with Russia or Iran.

To make matters worse, the axis has also worked to prevent the construction of pipelines that the United States covets. Putin seems to have convinced Kazakh leaders not to back any transport routes that avoid Russia. He has pushed for a gas pipeline under the Baltic Sea that bypasses Ukraine and Poland--two democracies that have poor relations with Moscow. Beijing, meanwhile, has sought to convince Central Asian nations to ship their oil and gas through new pipelines heading east to China.

Moving beyond initial trade and diplomatic ties, the autocrats have built military relationships, too. Russia and China held their largest joint military exercises last year, showing how two armed forces that once detested each other have put aside past mistrust. Russia has become China's biggest arms supplier, and Moscow also has made winning back its military influence in Central Asia a priority, regaining basing rights in countries like Tajikistan. For his part, Chávez has reportedly offered to sell Tehran F-16 fighters, while Russia has provided the mullahs with civilian nuclear technology. In addition, China, Russia, and other Central Asian nations are considering turning the SCO into a full-fledged alliance, which would make it one of Asia's premier security groups. SCO is the "most dangerous organization that Americans have never heard of," argues Christopher Brown, a Central Asia expert. Or, as David Wall of Cambridge's East Asia Institute told The Washington Times, if the Shanghai group added Iran, "it would essentially be an OPEC with bombs."

For the United States and its allies, the consequences of these military relationships are ominous. Protected by their new arrangements with Russian forces, Central Asian nations can think twice about allowing the United States to use their valuable bases. Uzbekistan has already evicted U.S. troops, while Kyrgyzstan has demanded vast increases in the rent paid by the Pentagon for bases. Venezuela's growing military strength has apparently allowed it to menace neighboring Colombia, a crucial U.S. ally, by providing support to the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, a terrorist group that has hijacked planes, murdered American missionaries, and assassinated Colombian ministers.

In July, Israel felt the effects of these growing military links firsthand. Steaming back to Haifa, an Israeli ship was blasted apart by a Hezbollah missile. When rescue crews reached the boat, they found a floating, flaming wreck--and two dead sailors. Even the sophisticated Israeli military appeared taken by surprise. The missile was powerful and accurate, a far cry from Hezbollah's normally scattershot Katyusha rockets. When IDF commanders learned more about the weapon, though, they might not have been so shocked: It was an Iranian radar-guided C-802 cruise missile, a version of the Silkworm, an anti-ship missile sold to Tehran by Beijing.

Iran's defiance of the international community over its nuclear program has provided the best early test of the alliance's intentions. After Ahmadinejad became president in August 2005, he promised an "irreversible" path toward nuclear enrichment. Europe and the United States stepped up efforts to make Iran suspend its enrichment program, building a dossier of Iran's clandestine nuclear efforts to present at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). In February, the IAEA found Iran noncompliant and voted to report Tehran to the U.N. Security Council. Russia and China won Iran more time at Turtle Bay, then refused to join U.N. statements calling for sanctions. This summer, the United States and Europe offered Iran another chance, suggesting new economic incentives if Iran halts its nuclear activities. Tehran responded slyly, with a government spokesman telling reporters that the incentives were just a starting point for negotiations. He could afford to be sly. Less than a week after Russia suggested, in July, it might be open to future sanctions against Iran, Putin backpedaled, announcing, "To talk of sanctions is premature."

These machinations provide a window into the future. On Iran, North Korea, and many other issues, the U.N. Security Council now faces a long-term divide among its five permanent members. Russia and China increasingly may vote together to block U.S., British, and French action against oil and gas producers (like Sudan and Burma), or simply to stop action against fellow authoritarian states (like Belarus and North Korea) even if those countries do not possess petroleum.

What's more, in this coming era of resource nationalism, democratization and human rights could well go out the window. Russia, China, Iran, and other autocracies are not only forestalling democracy at home but increasingly preventing democracy abroad, whether by helping prop up the Uzbek regime, refusing to support tough action against the Burmese junta, or backing anti-democratic leaders in nations like Belarus and Armenia.

Moreover, to combat this axis, the Bush administration has had to reach out to some odious leaders, badly compromising its stated commitment to democratization. After delivering a speech earlier this year in which he--rightly--blasted Putin for destroying democracy, Dick Cheney jetted off to Kazakhstan, a country whose oil production could triple by 2015 and where the United States wants to build a pipeline that would bypass Russia. Soon after, the administration made plans to have Kazakh leader Nursultan Nazarbayev visit the White House and the Bush family compound in Maine, though the State Department calls Nazarbayev's human rights record "poor." (The Kazakh government made substantial oil and gas promises to China and Russia anyway.) Shortly before Cheney's visit to the Kazakh steppes, Bush hosted another autocrat, Ilham Aliyev, president of Azerbaijan. Aliyev, who inherited the job from his father, had been refused a formal Washington visit for two years after allegedly rigging the 2003 presidential election. But, recently, Aliyev was welcomed to the United States with open arms; Azerbaijan is, like Kazakhstan, crucial to pipelines skirting Russia. Then there is Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo, the brutal longtime dictator of Equatorial Guinea, which can claim the third-highest oil exports in sub-Saharan Africa. Earlier this year, Obiang was treated to a private Washington audience with Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, who lavished praise on Equatorial Guinea's big man. "You are a good friend," Rice gushed.

The White House does not seem to have a coherent strategy for handling the axis of oil and autocracy. Such a strategy would require several parts. First, the United States needs to use public diplomacy to undermine the legitimacy of autocratic regimes. Cheney, at least, seemed to grasp this when he denounced Russia's growing authoritarianism. But such rhetoric cannot be accompanied by a shift away from democratization in other parts of the world, such as Kazakhstan or even Equatorial Guinea. For now, backing leaders like Obiang may deliver oil to the United States, but America's long-term interests rely on its ability to woo foreign publics. To do so, U.S. values must be consistent. As studies by Julia Sweig of the Council on Foreign Relations show, when average people around the world perceive the United States as helping them achieve a free, rights-oriented system, America's appeal soars.

Yet, while taking a consistently hard line with autocratic regimes, the United States and other major oil consumers must make one strategic exception to this rule: They must engage with China in a bid to split it off from its oil-producing allies. Though a dictatorship, China is not an unreasonable, unmovable regime, and it clearly fears being at the mercy of unstable governments like Venezuela in the future. Bush or his successor should push China to create a kind of "consumers' cartel" that would cooperate to pressure big producers like Saudi Arabia into reducing oil prices.

Perhaps most importantly, the administration needs to have a coherent plan for achieving energy independence. Despite Bush's declaration that the United States is "addicted to oil," Republicans last year offered oil and other fuel companies some $11 billion in tax breaks--funds that will only encourage them to drill more rather than focus on alternative energies. Worse, the White House has refused to force U.S. carmakers to produce more efficient cars.

If the United States and other major democracies do not implement some version of this strategy, things could get much worse. As nations hold tighter to their oil and gas, they will also think more about how they can defend these crucial assets. According to China scholars David Zweig and Bi Jianhai, Beijing has started to consider a new naval strategy in which it would try to control sea-lanes, construct a blue-water navy, and build chains of military bases around Asia. In April, two leading Chinese academics suggested, in a much-noted article, that Beijing now might fight a war to secure its energy.

Other militaries already have begun to respond. In April, the United States created its first war game that fought an alliance of China, Iran, and Venezuela. Beijing and Tokyo both want to exploit the oil and gas resources in the East China Sea, which has already led to near-clashes. After Japan began drilling for gas in disputed waters last year, Chinese state media warned that conflict was "inevitable." Five Chinese warships, some armed with missiles, then appeared at a Chinese drilling platform in the sea near where Japan had staked its claim. According to Japan, the Chinese ships targeted a Japanese reconnaissance aircraft hovering overhead before choosing not to shoot it down. Tokyo did not back off; it fortified its claims in the sea and threatened military force against future Chinese actions. This "could lead to the kind of vicious cycle that descends into military conflict," leading Japanese politician Keizo Takemi warned in The Economist.

Sound familiar? In the 1930s and early '40s, the last age of resource nationalism, Japan had turned its back on previous liberal reforms and moved toward fascism. Its powerful economy was short on oil, gas, rubber, and other commodities. Insecure about British and U.S. alliances in Asia, Tokyo justified its invasions of the Dutch East Indies and other parts of Asia by claiming the West was preventing it from accessing supposedly free markets for resources. Japan also inked a loose alliance with Germany--which itself invaded Russia partly to gain Soviet oil--that ultimately became much more substantial. By August 1941, the United States had declared an oil embargo on Japan, heightening the tension over resources. In October 1941, Japan's leaders decided on total war if the embargo was not removed within a month. You know the rest.

Bush Flirts with the Truth but Strikes Out

Continuing the pattern that has defined his administration, President Bush sought to place the blame on President Clinton for North Korea’s bomb detonation this week. Bush’s explanation is that bilateral agreements between the US and North Korea signed by Clinton failed to stem North Korean behavior. Chiming in, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said: "The United States tried direct dialogue with the North Koreans in the '90s, and that resulted in the North Koreans signing onto agreements that they then didn't keep." Bush then claimed that his strategy, based on multi-national talks was much superior. Reaching this conclusion the day after North Korea’s bomb explosion takes a fair amount of gall. But as noted in yesterday’s Washington Post, his analysis is neither accurate nor true.

Bush's current policy, in fact, envisions direct, bilateral negotiations with North Korea on certain issues in the six-nation talks, such as missile proliferation and normalizing relations. That commitment to direct talks is enshrined in the agreement of principles guiding future negotiations that was reached in Beijing in September 2005. Indeed, Rice was prepared to authorize her chief negotiator to travel to Pyongyang in November 2005, provided that North Korea shut down its nuclear reactor as a sign of good faith. It refused that condition, and the trip was scrubbed.

By the same token, it is not fully accurate to describe the negotiations that led to a 1994 agreement between the United States and North Korea as purely the result of one-on-one negotiations. During talks that produced the Agreed Framework, in which North Korea said it would freeze its nuclear program, U.S. negotiators briefed Japanese and South Korean officials every day. South Korea and Japan agreed to bankroll much of the cost of the light-water reactors that were to be provided to North Korea under the deal.

Robert L. Gallucci, the chief negotiator of the accord and now dean of the Georgetown School of Foreign Service, said it is a "ludicrous thing" to say that the Clinton agreement failed. For eight years, the Agreed Framework kept North Korea's five-megawatt plutonium reactor frozen and under international inspection, while North Korea did not build planned 50- and 200-megawatt reactors. If those reactors had been built and running, he said, North Korea would now have enough plutonium for more than 100 nuclear weapons.

By Gallucci's account, North Korea may have produced a small amount of plutonium for one or two weapons before Clinton came into office -- during the administration of Bush's father -- but "no more material was created on his watch."

When the Bush administration decided it had conclusive proof of secretive enrichment in July 2002, it confronted North Korea and terminated fuel oil deliveries promised under the Agreed Framework. In response, North Korea evicted the inspectors, restarted the reactor and retrieved weapons-grade plutonium from 8,000 fuel rods that had been kept in a cooling pond. Intelligence analysts now think that, before Monday's apparent nuclear test, North Korea had enough plutonium for as many as a dozen weapons.

While the Bush administration accused Pyongyang, North Koreans complained bitterly that the United States was the chief violator of the pact because the reactors were years behind in construction and because promises to end hostile relations and normalize ties were not fulfilled.

Before the crisis in 2002, the Bush administration was prepared to hold bilateral talks with North Korea, though it took nearly two years after Bush came into office to arrange them. Afterward, administration insiders argued over the best approach before settling on meeting with the North Koreans only in the presence of officials from other nations.

Then-Secretary of State Colin L. Powell pressed China to host three-way discussions because it was clear that Bush was opposed to direct talks, according to the new book "Soldier: The Life of Colin Powell," by Washington Post Associate Editor Karen DeYoung. Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld adamantly opposed any dialogue, arguing in a series of memos that the goal should be the collapse of North Korea's government, the book says.

The talks were expanded to include Japan, South Korea and Russia. During a flight to Africa in July 2003, Powell won Bush's agreement to allow U.S. negotiators to meet with the North Koreans on the sidelines of the talks, in part to assuage the Chinese, who wanted more direct engagement between the United States and North Korea. Conservatives opposed to negotiations came to embrace the six-party format because they thought that it was so cumbersome that it would not achieve much, and because North Korea's behavior grated on other participants.

In 2003, after North Korea was discovered to have violated the agreement and the Bush administration terminated it, then-Secretary of State Colin S. Powell told The Washington Post:

The previous administration I give great credit to for freezing that plutonium site. Lots of nuclear weapons were not made because of the Agreed Framework and the work of President Clinton and his team.

North Korean Bomb

President Bush is gearing up to use the news of North Korea’s bomb detonation as the reason to vote Republican in the November elections. He will claim that only the Republicans know how to conduct a war against US enemies. This is further from the truth then even the history of the past six years implies.

The question is which came first – the Axis of Evil or the Bush speech about the Axis of Evil? In January 2002 Bush named Iraq, Iran, and North Korea as our prime enemies. A year was spent preparing for invasion of Iraq on trumped up claims of the possession of weapons of mass destruction and ties to terrorism. The much more real threats of Iran and North Korea were deemphasized, let alone our cut-and-run Afghanistan policy. North Korea watched what happened in Iraq, listened to Bush rhetoric, and although seemingly a self-destructive government, was not stupid in concluding that they stood a much better chance of avoiding a similar invasion if they were a nuclear power.

Our descent into the Iraq morass made us unable to effectively counter any North Korean move. Now we are talking about sanctions, which will further isolate North Korea. But North Korea has already isolated itself by its own design and our ability to further deprive them of what they need is limited.

The Bush policy, as with Iran, is to refuse meeting one-on-one with either country. Supposedly, John Bolton at the UN does occasionally use back door meetings (I guess using the diplomatic skills he honed as a Bush lawyer in Florida in November 2000.) That doesn’t seem to be working with either country.

The Bush performance during his six years as President is one of incompetence coupled with lies. The last few months have revealed to more and more people the dearth of ideas emanating from the administration. The NIE estimate concluded that Iraq has made terrorism worse and that the US is less safe than before we started there. Woodward’s book has shown how the administration ignored reality in favor of their agenda. And the Foley affair shows the paucity of leadership in the Republican Congress.

The only chance for a realistic assessment of how we interact with the rest of the world in the two remaining years of this administration is for the Democrats to gain control of Congress and force the administration into compromise or if nothing else inaction. If the Democratic candidates can't counter the Bush claims of the next four weeks they don't deserve to be elected.

Republican Sleaze

Tales of lobbyist influence in Congress and the White House continue to bedevil the Republicans. Karl Rove’s office is increasingly being linked to the Abramoff scandal. This week, Mark Foley (R-Fla.) resigned after news of inappropriate and sexually explicit emails and instant messages he sent to Congressional Pages were revealed in the press. Foley is obviously in need of help and his disgrace is not the issue. The allegations revealed all too typical Republican attitudes toward publicly saying one thing while privately doing its opposite. Foley built his reputation on ‘protecting’ children while publicly castigating sexual predators. He is the Chairman of the Congressional Missing and Exploited Children's Caucus!

Even more reprehensible, the Republican leadership found out that there were improprieties at the beginning of 2006. Their first instinct, which lasted until this week’s breaking news, was to verbally tell Foley to stay away from the pages, and then do everything they could to insure that this news did not become public. Foley remained the head of the caucus and the visual face of the Republican concern for abused children.

Speaker Hastert stated publicly that he first learned of this event this week until other Republicans forced him into telling the truth. Initially he seemed content to allow Representative Tom Reynolds (R-NY), Chairman of the National Republican Congressional Committee be blamed for not following through on the original information. But Reynolds decided not to be the fall guy and informed the press that he had notified Hastert early in 2006.

Most revealing, the head of the House group responsible for oversight of the Page program, chose not to tell the one Democrat in the group, nor the other Republican. Instead of going to the House Republican leadership, he chose to inform Reynolds. Rahn Emanuel (D-Ill.), Chairman of the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee got to the heart of the issue when he said "that's to protect a member, not to protect a child." This reveals real Republican values - do anything as long as it gets you elected.

Today in one of the more amazing political statements ever made, Sen. George Allen (R-Va.) issued a request that his Senatorial campaign be judged on issues not character, admitting that the character issues that are derailing his reelction can't be overcome. For six years we have had 'values' thrown at us as if only Republican candidates had them. What they really have had is the ability to mislead the American public into believing this. The same misleading rhetoric that they have used regarding terrorism and Iraq, which is being exposed with new revelations, is now also showing up their claims about values.

Lies

An excuse for the Administration’s justifications about the policies they pursued in Iraq was that they were based on the best intelligence available and even though much of that proved to be wrong, strong and decisive action was needed to fight those who were arrayed against us. The critics at that time argued that Bush used selected information to bolster a pre-formed agenda.

It is now becoming apparent that the administration ignored accurate intelligence and continues to this day to blatantly lie to the American public about Iraq reality. In addition to the recent NIE report that predicts an increase in insurgent activity, and the just released Bob Woodward book “State of Denial”, a new intelligence report on Iraq is being held until after the November election. Given the examples below, it is obvious that its revelations would be detrimental to the Administration. If there were anything favorable to the Bush position it certainly would be immediately released

The Washington Post today, published a concise table contrasting the administration’s words to the information available to them, although not to the public:

January, February 2003. "It would take 450,000 troops to occupy Iraq, based on experience in Bosnia. Simply securing the most important 25 major cities in Iraq would take 180,000 to 200,000 troops if there were lots of opposition to the US presence and fighting among the Iraqis" – The Pentagon’s Intelligence Planning Division.

March 2004. “To suggest that we need several hundred thousand troops there after military operations cease, after the conflict ends, I don’t think is accurate. I think that’s an overstatement.” Vice President Cheney.


November 11, 2003. "We are seeing the establishment of an insurgency in Iraq" – Robert Richer, head of the CIA’s Near East Division telling Bush and the National Security Council.

November 11, 2003. “I need more data. I don’t want to read in the New York Times that we are facing an insurgency. I don’t want anyone to say it is an insurgency” – Bush to Richer.
“We are not only containing the terrorist threat, we are turning it back.” President Bush in a speech at the Heritage Foundation.


April and May 2005. The overall insurgent attacks in April numbered about 1,700 with 52 Americans dead. In May, the number of attacks rose to 2,000, and 82 Americans died – Pentagon statistics.

May 30, 2005. “I think they’re in the last throes, if you will, of the insurgency.” – Vice President Cheney.


May 24, 2006. “Insurgents and terrorists retain the resources and capabilities to sustain and even increase current level of violence through the next year.” – US Secret Intelligence Assessment.

May 22. 2006. “Years from now people will look back on the formation of a unity government as a decisive moment in the story of liberty, a moment when freedom gained a firm foothold in the Middle East and the forces of terror began their long retreat” – President Bush.


Late September 2006. “We also assess that the global Jihadist movement – which includes Al Qaida, affiliated and independent terrorist groups, and emerging networks and cells – is spreading and adapting to counterterrorism efforts… If this trend continues, threats to US interests at home and abroad, will become more adverse, leading to increasing attacks worldwide – Declassified National Intelligence Estimate report.

Early September 2006. “Many Americans… ask the same questions five years after 9/11. The answer is yes. America is safer. We are safer because we have taken action to protect the homeland. We are safer because we are on the offensive against our enemies overseas. We’re safer because of the skill and sacrifice of the brave Americans who defend our people – President Bush.